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DOLLARS FOR VICTIMS OF A
“VICTIMLESS” CRIME:
A DEFENSE OF DRUG DEALER
LIABILITY ACTS
Nicholas Reiter*
INTRODUCTION
Although often perceived as a “victimless crime,” drug use
perpetuated by the illegal drug market continues to harm many
members of society, with casualties including non-users as well
as users themselves. Worse yet, criminals continue to experience
massive profits as the drug trade within the United States
generates revenues in excess of $65 billion per year.1 In 1992,
former United States Attorney Daniel Bent proposed legislation
that would provide third party plaintiffs with a civil remedy for
injuries caused by the use of illegal drugs.2 Bent’s proposal
gained notoriety after the American Legislative Exchange
*

Brooklyn Law School Class of 2008; B.A. The College of William and
Mary, 2004. The author wishes to thank Prof. Jerome Leitner for his support
and enthusiasm, as well as for permission to use any of the materials at his
disposal. The author also wishes to thank Thomas Daniel for his incredible
attitude and constant willingness to lend a helping hand.
1
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL POLICY. WHAT AMERICA’S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS, 3
(2001) available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf
/american_users_spend_2002.pdf.
2
Clinton W. Taylor, The Oklahoma Drug Dealer Liability Act: A Civil
Remedy for a “Victimless” Crime, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 227, 234 (1999) (citing
Ill. Permits Suits Against Drug Dealers, NAT’L L. J., Aug. 28, 1995, at A8;
Arnold Ceballos, New State Laws Let People Sue Drug Dealers, WALL ST.
J., July 16, 1996, at B1).
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Council3 adopted the model statute.4 Legislators took notice, and
since 1994, fifteen jurisdictions have enacted legislation
imposing civil liability on drug dealers.5 These laws, collectively
referred to as Drug Dealer Liability Acts (“DDLAs”), allow
third parties to bring a civil action against a drug dealer after
suffering harm at the hands of a drug user. For example, under
Oklahoma’s Drug Dealer Liability Statute, a parent-plaintiff
could sue a defendant for damages on grounds that the plaintiff’s
son committed suicide while under the influence of drugs
provided by the defendant.
While embraced by legislators and voters, drug dealer
liability statutes have been criticized by some legal scholars for
circumventing the due process clause, violating fundamental
principles of tort law, and, in some cases, infringing upon
defendants’ protection against double jeopardy.6 Specifically,
critics of drug dealer liability statutes take issue with the relaxed
causation requirements and imposition of a civil sanction after
some defendants suffer a criminal penalty.7
Despite such criticisms, however, drug dealer liability
statutes should be held constitutionally valid. Legislators have
3

The American Legislative Exchange Council is a national law reform
organization consisting of over 2,500 bipartisan state legislators.
4
Taylor, supra note 2.
5
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16.124.102-112 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11700-30 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-801 (1998); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 772.12 (West Supp. 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-46 (West
2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663 D-14 (LexisNexis 2006); 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 57/1-85 (West Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-701-20 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2800.61-.76 (2006); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1601-19 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-15
(West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2-424-34 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-54-10-140 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20-C1 (2006); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-37E-1-14 (West 2006); 19 V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 641-58
(2006).
6
See, e.g., Wendy Stasell, “Shopping” for Defendants: Market Liability
Under the Illinois Drug Dealer Liability Act, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1023
(1996); Joel W. Baar, Let the Drug Dealer Beware: Market Share Liability in
Michigan for the Injuries Caused by the Illegal Drug Market, 32 VAL. U. L.
REV. 139 (1997).
7
Baar, supra note 6.
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enacted drug dealer liability statutes primarily in an effort to
provide victims of the illegal drug market with a remedy, as
well as to deter people from engaging in such harmful criminal
activity.8 Furthermore, traditional tort principles tolerate
legislation that provides a statutory remedy designed to repair
injustice inherent in the common law.9 In fact, even before the
first drug dealer liability statute was enacted, state courts held
that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, was best equipped
to address the public policy interest of providing a compensation
system for plaintiffs for whom it is difficult to prove causation.10
Last, in terms of the double jeopardy issue, the Supreme Court
has departed from its previous position on civil sanctions that
serve deterrent purposes.11 In Hudson v. United States, the
Supreme Court abandoned the notion that a sanction acting to
deter criminal conduct was a criminal punishment per se, and
instead required “the clearest proof” that the legislators intended
a civil penalty to act as a criminal punishment before
determining a statute to be in violation of the Constitution’s
Double Jeopardy Clause.12
This Note focuses on the constitutionality of DDLAs and
how such statutes parallel traditionally accepted principles of tort
law. Part I explains why common-law tort principles are unable
to provide a satisfactory civil remedy against drug dealers. Part
II provides a detailed description of the Model Drug Dealer
Liability Act (“MDDLA”), as proposed by former United States
Attorney Bent, and the case law that serves as the foundation for
8

See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 740 s 57/5 (West 2006).
See, e.g., Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209 (Wis. 1911) (holding
that the legislature may constitutionally abolish certain defenses available at
common law as a matter of public policy).
10
Case v. Fireboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987) (holding that
while there were policy reasons for allowing a victim of asbestos to recover
against a number of asbestos companies without proving direct causation, the
court should allow the legislature to create a civil remedy for such victims
rather than create one on its own).
11
522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488 (1997) (overturning United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)).
12
Id. at 100 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)).
9
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its risk-oriented approach to market share liability. Part III
addresses the constitutional challenges to the MDDLA and
explains why the MDDLA is constitutionally valid. Finally, this
Note reviews the arguments in support of DDLAs and discusses
the appropriateness of such legislation in light of the driving
forces behind drug dealers’ decisions to participate in the illegal
drug market.
I. DIFFICULTIES FOR VICTIMS OF THE ILLICIT DRUG TRADE
UNDER COMMON-LAW TORT PRINICPLES
Under the common law, plaintiffs in a negligence action
must prove four traditional elements: duty, breach, cause, and
harm.13 Additionally, plaintiffs must also contend with the
affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption
of risk.14 Three of the elements of a negligence claim—duty,
breach, and harm—are relatively easy for plaintiffs to prove
when suing a drug dealer for damages. In terms of duty, state
and federal legislators have deemed the distribution of illicit
drugs illegal, thereby reflecting each person’s obligation not to
engage in such behavior.15 Breach of this duty can easily be
demonstrated by either a conviction under the relevant drug
distribution statutes or a showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant distributed illicit drugs. Harm may
also be shown easily where there is evidence of destruction of
property while under the influence of narcotics, the death of a
loved one due to an overdose, or other evidentiary bases of
damages.
Establishing the requisite causal connections, however, is
more difficult. In order to prove causation, tort law requires that
there be a reasonable connection between the defendant’s act or
omission and the harm suffered.16 Plaintiffs may satisfy this
13

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
14
Id., § 65, at 451.
15
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West. 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.021
(West 2006).
16
KEETON ET. AL, supra note 13, § 41, at 263.
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element by showing that the defendant’s actions constituted a
substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm.17 In order to
meet this burden, it is critical that the plaintiff be able to
identify the defendant as the tortfeasor.18 In other words,
because mere speculation as to the defendant’s role in causing
the harm is insufficient under traditional principles of tort law,19
the plaintiff must show that the defendant either supplied the
drug user with drugs himself or, alternatively, that he played a
substantial factor in supplying the specific drug user with illicit
drugs.
The nature of the illicit drug industry makes it difficult for
plaintiffs to identify a drug user’s dealer. Rather than conduct
transactions with large-scale dealers who possess considerable
assets, drug users often interact with small-level dealers and
have little knowledge of the bigger players within the chain of
distribution. Consequently, third-party plaintiffs and drug users
alike have a difficult time identifying a defendant within the
drug chain capable of satisfying an adequate award.20
Further problems arise despite a plaintiff’s ability to identify
a large-scale drug dealer in some instances. For example, if a
defendant with considerable assets is convicted of illicit drug
distribution, his identity may become known to the potential
plaintiff, but the plaintiff will need to demonstrate that the harm
was foreseeable and that the doctrine of superseding cause is not
applicable.21 The foreseeability doctrine forces plaintiffs to
confront the obstacle of no “negligence in the air” as explained
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.22 The Palsgraf court
17

Id. § 41, at 267. See also Carney v. Goodman, 270 S.W.2d 572, 575
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1954) (defining legal cause as conduct that is a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm providing there is no statute relieving the
actor from liability).
18
KEETON ET. AL, supra note 13, § 41, at 269.
19
Id.
20
Kevin G. Meeks, From Sindell to Street Pushers: Imposing Market
Share Tort Liability on Illegal Drug Dealers, 33 GA. L. REV. 315, 326
(1998).
21
Id. at 327-28.
22
248 N.Y. 339, 341 (1928).
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held that a plaintiff must show that the defendant has breached a
duty owed to himself rather than a violation of duty owed to
someone else.23 Accordingly, courts follow the general rule that
despite a defendant’s negligence, there is no duty owed to the
unforeseeable plaintiff.24 Although a defendant convicted of
distributing illicit drugs on a large scale may be negligent in a
broad sense, it is difficult for plaintiffs to show, under common
law tort principles, that the defendant was responsible for the
distribution of the specific drugs used by the specific drug user
who played a role in causing the harm suffered. Likewise, it is
difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate that a reasonable person in
the defendant’s position could have foreseen the harm suffered
by a particular class of persons of which the plaintiff is a
member.
Furthermore, even if plaintiffs are able to overcome
problems of foreseeability, they often fail to recover damages
from a drug dealer on the grounds that the drug user’s conduct
constituted a superseding cause25—the event which produces the
resulting harm after the negligence of the defendant, thereby
preventing the defendant from being held liable for his negligent
conduct.26
Under the common law, a drug dealer can be absolved of
liability despite his negligence in the same way a bartender may
be insulated from liability for the negligent acts of a tavern’s
patrons: even where a bartender has been found negligent for
serving alcohol to a patron, courts have traditionally denied
recovery from the bartender or the tavern owner on the grounds
23

Id. at 343. But see, KEETON ET AL, supra note 13, § 36, at 224
(stating that “the class of persons to be protected [by some statutes] may of
course be a very broad one, extending to all those likely to be injured by the
violation” and therefore, “a statute requiring druggists to label poisons, a
pure food act, a law prohibiting the sale of firearms to minors, or an
ordinance governing the servicing of gas lines, must clearly be intended for
the benefit of any member of the public who may be injured by the act or
thing prohibited.”).
24
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 43 at 285.
25
See Meeks, supra note 20, at 327.
26
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, §44 at 301.
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that the damages were too remote. Rather than the sale of
alcohol, its consumption is typically viewed as the sole
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.27
During the last quarter century however, many state
legislatures have enacted Dram Shop Acts, thereby providing a
civil remedy for plaintiffs seeking to recover damages from
negligent alcohol vendors.28 Before Dram Shop legislation
became prevalent, courts were unwilling to subject defendants to
liability for negligently distributing alcohol because of
insufficient statutory authority.29 It was not until the 1980s,
when drinking and driving started to receive attention as a social
issue, that legislatures began enacting expansive legislation
providing courts with statutory authority for imposing tort
liability for the negligent sale of alcohol.30 Today, forty-one
states and the District of Columbia have Dram Shop
legislation.31 Such legislation abrogates the common law’s
proximate cause requirement and allows a third-party plaintiff to
recover damages from parties who sell alcohol. Much like
plaintiffs seeking to recover damages from drug dealers under
common law principles of negligence, plaintiffs under Dram
Shop Acts are barred from recovering damages against alcohol
vendors if the legislatures did not provide such a statutory

27

Meeks, supra note 20, at 328 (citing Belding v. Johnson, 12 S.E. 304,
305 (Ga. 1890)).
28
See generally, Richard Smith, A Comparative Analysis of Dramshop
Liability and a Proposal for Uniform Legislation, 25 J. CORP. L. 553 (2000).
29
Id. at 555 (citing Felder v. Butler, 438 A.2d 494, 499 (Md. 1981);
Holmes v. Circo, 244 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Neb. 1976); Williamson v. Old
Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 624 (Va. 1986)).
30
Id. at 556 (citing McIsaac v. Monte Carlo Club, Inc., 587 So. 2d 320,
324 (Ala. 1991)).
31
Sean A. O’Connor, Last Call: The South Carolina Supreme Court
Turns Out the Lights on First-Party Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action Against
Tavern Owners, 50 S.C. L. REV. 1095, 1100, 1999 (commenting on South
Carolina’s reluctance to allow intoxicated persons who have played a role in
causing a third-party plaintiff’s harm from recovering under the State’s Dram
Shop Act) (citing El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex.
1987)).
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remedy.32 Dram Shop liability has been accepted as a legislative
solution for the dilemma faced by third parties who have
suffered harm at the hands of intoxicated parties and negligent
alcohol vendors—a remedy that is consistent with the judiciary’s
notion that such questions are better addressed by the
legislature.33
While Dram Shop Acts serve as a good example of how and
why the legislature may help resolve inequity resulting from
common law tort principles, a drug dealer liability statute
written to mirror Dram Shop Acts would fail to provide a
solution to the causation problems that plaintiffs face under
common law tort principles. The critical shortfall of such a
legislative scheme would be that it would require plaintiffs to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s
drugs were the same drugs used by the party who injured the
plaintiff. Despite this shortcoming, some legal scholars have
suggested that DDLAs should parallel Dram Shop Acts.34 Under
this legislative proposal, dubbed “Gram Shop Liability,” a third
party could recover from a drug dealer if she proved “1) that the
drug dealer’s illegal drugs were used by the party who injured
her, and 2) that these drugs contributed to the party’s action that
resulted in her injury.”35 Admittedly, these requirements would
help plaintiffs overcome the prohibition on recovery for
“negligence in the air” handed down by Palsgraf,36 but as
discussed earlier, the nature of the illicit drug market makes it
difficult, and in some cases nearly impossible, for plaintiffs to
32

Meeks, supra note 20, at 328.
See Case v. Fireboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987); see also,
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 181 (1984), discussion infra notes
98-114 (holding that departing from common law principles to provide a
method of recovery for an injured plaintiff was more acceptable than
permitting a negligent defendant to escape liability).
34
See, e.g. Michael E. Bronfin, “Gram Shop” Liability: Holding Drug
Dealers Civilly Liable for Injuries to Third Parties and Underage Purchasers,
1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 345 (1994).
35
Id. at 353.
36
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 248 N.Y. 339, 341
(1928).
33
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identify high-level drug dealers as the persons who constituted a
substantial factor in the resulting injury.37 Therefore, while
“Gram Shop Liability” is appealing because DDLAs would
more closely adhere to traditional common law tort principles,
thereby minimizing constitutional scrutiny, such legislation
would do little, if anything, to provide plaintiffs with a solution
to the causation problems faced under the common law’s
negligence doctrine.
To summarize, plaintiffs seeking to recover damages as a
result of a drug dealer’s negligence are barred from recovery
under common law tort principles. Despite the duty not to
engage in the distribution of illicit drugs, the obvious breach of
this duty upon conviction of a crime or other evidentiary
grounds, and the significant harm that the illegal drug trade
regularly inflicts upon third parties, the illegality of drug dealing
requires drug dealers to maintain anonymity and, as a result,
precludes many potential plaintiffs from demonstrating
causation. As the popularity of Dram Shop Acts indicates, our
legal system has embraced legislative efforts to remedy injustices
resulting from instances in which the common law’s tort
principles prevent plaintiffs from recovering damages from
negligent defendants. However, this does not necessarily imply
that “Gram Shop Liability” is an appropriate solution. Rather, in
the vast majority of cases, “Gram Shop Liability” would fail to
provide any assistance to plaintiffs seeking to recover from drug
dealers as the proposal requires plaintiffs to prove that the drug
dealer supplied drugs to the party whose conduct formed the
basis for the plaintiff’s suit.38
Although this approach would limit the constitutional
arguments against DDLAs, it is an inadequate measure for
achieving the original goal of such a statute—helping plaintiffs
overcome the causation obstacles under the common law’s tort
doctrine. Accordingly, fifteen jurisdictions have enacted
legislation based upon the MDDLA in an effort to provide
plaintiffs who have suffered harm as a result of the illicit drug
37
38

Meeks, supra note 20.
See Bronfin, supra note 34, at 353.
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trade with a remedy while ensuring that such legislation adheres
to constitutional principals.39
II. THE MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY STATUTE
Although fifteen different jurisdictions have enacted drug
dealer liability statutes,40 each jurisdiction closely follows the
provisions set forth in the Model Drug Dealer Liability Act
(“MDDLA”), which has been adopted by the American
Legislative Exchange Council.41 For this reason and for
purposes of efficiency, this Note focuses primarily on the
MDDLA’s language, while intermittently referring to statutes
enacted by Illinois, Michigan, South Dakota, and Oklahoma as
representative samples of current legislation based upon the
MDDLA.42
A. Who May Recover Under the MDDLA
Potential plaintiffs under the MDDLA include relatives of
drug users, injured members of the public, and others that have
incurred a financial loss as a result of the person’s drug use.43
Although drug users may bring suit themselves, unless the user
is a minor, a drug-user’s voluntary decision to use drugs limits
his recoverable damages.44 Admittedly, the notion that drug
users should be able to recover any damages from drug dealers
initially provokes a negative reaction. However, there are
several policy reasons for including drug users among potential

39

Supra note 5.
Id.
41
MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT (Daniel Bent 1996), available
at http://www.modelddla.com /Model_ Act. htm.
42
It should be noted that the first judgment rendered under a drug dealer
liability statute, and the first state to enact such legislation, was in Michigan
in the case of Ficano v. Clemens, No. 95-512918 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne
C’ty. 1995), discussed infra notes 121-30.
43
MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(c).
44
Id. § 7.
40
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plaintiffs.45
First and foremost, allowing users to bring suit under the
MDDLA furthers the deterrent goal of the statute because such
plaintiffs are in a particularly good position to identify drug
dealers whose actions led to harm.46 Allowing such recovery
provides an incentive for users to identify drug dealers and seek
treatment for their addiction.47 Furthermore, only drug users
who have never dealt drugs would likely bring a suit under the
MDDLA because, if the plaintiff were a dealer, the defendant
could file a counter-claim thereby making the suit even more
incriminatory for the user.48 By creating severe penalties for
drug distribution offenses and relatively minor criminal penalties
for drug users who have no intent to distribute, legislators
throughout the country have, appropriately, identified drug
distribution as a more serious offense than using or possessing
drugs.49 Accordingly, the idea that drug users may recover
damages, albeit limited damages, from drug dealers is consistent
with the criminal law’s distinction between these two classes of
offenses.
Notwithstanding these different criminal classifications, the
MDDLA also recognizes that there is a significant distinction
between drug users who have suffered injury at the hands of
drug dealers, and third-party plaintiffs who are not themselves
drug users and have suffered harm as a result of a drug dealer’s
45

Daniel Bent and Sharon Burnham, Imposing Products Liability for
Illegal Drugs, http://www.modelddla.com/Imposing_Products_Liability_for_
Illegal_Drugs.htm (last visited April 10, 2007).
46
Id.
47
Meeks, supra note 20 at 351, n.104.
48
Bent et al, supra note 45.
49
See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b) (West. 2006) (establishing minimum prison
sentences of 10 years for a defendant’s first drug distribution offense, 20
years if death or serious bodily injury occurs as a result of a defendant’s first
drug distribution offense, 20 years if the defendant has prior drug distribution
convictions, and life imprisonment if death or serious bodily injury occurs
and the defendant has prior drug distribution convictions); but see, 21
U.S.C.A. § 844(a) (West 2006) (establishing a maximum sentence of 1 year
in prison for simple possession and up to two years if the defendant has prior
possession convictions).
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actions.50 As a result, the MDDLA limits the extent of damages
user-plaintiffs may recover, and requires that several deterrencefocused provisions be satisfied before the user may recover
damages.51 For example, under the MDDLA a user-plaintiff
must: 1) personally disclose to law enforcement, more than six
months before filing the suit, all information he has regarding
the source of illegal drugs; 2) refrain from using illegal drugs
during the six months before filing the action; and 3) remain
drug-free for the duration of the suit.52 Most significantly, userplaintiffs are barred from recovering non-economic damages.53
Therefore, users are limited to recovery for pecuniary losses,
including “the cost of treatment, rehabilitation, medical
expenses, loss of economic or educational potential, loss of
productivity, absenteeism, accidents or injury, and any other
pecuniary loss proximately caused by the person’s illegal drug
use.”54 Users may also seek award for the cost of the suit,
including reasonable attorney fees and expenses for expert
witnesses.55 Thus, although all plaintiffs are permitted to recover
economic damages, public policy dictates that only plaintiffs
who did not knowingly use drugs may recover non-economic
damages.56
Plaintiffs who do not knowingly use drugs are distinguished
from voluntary drug users, however, and like third-party
plaintiffs, may seek punitive and exemplary damages in addition
to economic damages.57 For example, the drug user who
knowingly sells crack to a pregnant mother, thereby injuring the
mother and her unborn child, would likely be held liable for
punitive or exemplary damages, but the child’s guardian would
have to file suit on his behalf; the mother would not be eligible
for punitive, exemplary, and other non-economic damages
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

See MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 7.
Id. § 7(a).
Id.
Id. § 7(c).
Id.
Id.
MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(c)(2).
Id. § 6(c)(3).
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because she knowingly used drugs.58
Put plainly, the MDDLA focuses upon harm to third parties
and drug users stemming from drug dealers’ negligence.59 While
the full range of recoverable damages is available for parties
who incur injury at the hands of a drug user and for involuntary
drug users, public policy argues against allowing voluntary drug
users to recover non-economic damages.60
B. Expanding the Class of Defendants to Help Solve
Causation Issues
The MDDLA establishes two different classes of defendants
from which plaintiffs may recover damages.61 Plaintiffs may
bring suit against a party who knowingly distributed or
participated in the distribution of an illegal drug that was used
by the user.62 Alternatively, in an effort to expand the class of
defendants, plaintiffs may file suit against a party who
knowingly participated in the illegal drug market but who may
have not necessarily distributed the drug used by the user.63
Plaintiffs filing suit against the second class of defendants must
demonstrate the following: that the defendant distributed illegal
drugs in the same target community as that in which the drug
user used drugs, that the defendant distributed the same type of
illegal drug as was used by the drug user, and that the defendant
was engaged in the distribution of drugs during the same time
period in which the user used drugs.64 In terms of causation
58

Bent et al., supra note 45.
Id.
60
Id.
61
MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(b).
62
Id.
63
Bent et. al., supra note 45.
64
Id. “Target community” is defined, at a minimum, as the state house
legislative district in which the defendant’s conduct was located. However,
this geographic area may expand in relation to the severity of the drug
distribution activity. For example, a defendant whose participation in the
illicit drug market constitutes a level 1 offense would be considered to have a
target community of the state house legislative district in which his negligence
59
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principles, there is little controversy, over the first class of
defendants because the defendants in these cases knowingly
distributed illegal drugs, the use of which forms the basis of
recovery. However, legal scholars take issue with the second set
of potential defendants because the causal connection is relaxed
in an effort to overcome the obstacles plaintiffs face when
attempting to identify members of the illicit drug trade
community.65
While it must be conceded that the MDDLA permits a
plaintiff to impose liability upon a defendant who may not have
actually provided drugs to the individual whose use forms the
basis of recovery, critics of the MDDLA lose sight of the fact
that the legislation serves as a statutory solution toward the
difficult task of providing victims of the illegal drug trade with a
remedy.66 It is the legislature’s responsibility to assist plaintiffs
who have suffered a distinct harm but who have difficulty either
identifying the correct defendant against whom to bring an
action, or demonstrating that the defendant, while having clearly
committed a tortious act, committed the specific act leading to
the particular plaintiff’s harm.67
Throughout our legal system, legislatures have helped
plaintiffs overcome obstacles particular to the common law’s
principles of negligence.68 The wide-spread enactment of
workers’ compensation statutes serves as a clear example of how
legislatures help plaintiffs who have suffered harm to recover
damages despite clear hindrances presented by the common
occurred, whereas a defendant whose conduct constituted a level 2 offense
would be considered to have a target community of the state house legislative
district in which his negligence occurred plus all legislative districts with
borders adjacent to the district in which his negligence took place. Defendants
meeting the criteria for a level 3 offense would be considered to have a target
community of the districts included for level 2 defendants, plus all districts
with borders adjacent to the level 2 borders. Finally, level 4 defendants are
considered to have a target community of the entire state. MODEL DRUG
DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 9.
65
See Stasell, supra note 6.
66
MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41 § 2.
67
Case v. Fireboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987).
68
See supra notes 9-11, and accompanying text.
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law.69
Workers’ compensation acts were created to combat the very
limited tort liability of employers to their employees under the
common law.70 Traditional common law provided a relatively
low level of liability for employers because labor opportunities
were in high supply, and therefore, employees could seek work
under a different employer if their current working conditions
were not safe or adequate.71 Before workers’ compensation acts
became common, employees were often limited by the “unholy
trinity” of common law defenses—contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule.72 This trio of
common law defenses often meant that a “momentary lapse of
caution on the part of the worker was penalized by casting the
entire burden of his injury upon him, in the face of continued
and greater negligence of the employer.”73 Courts were
unwilling to change the common law rules by themselves, and
instead awaited reform from the legislatures.74 Recognizing the
injustices faced by injured employees under the common law,
legislatures rapidly began passing workers’ compensation acts.75
Today, all fifty states have workers’ compensation acts and “it
has been said that no subject of labor legislation ever has made
such progress or received such general acceptance of its
principles in so brief a period.”76
State legislatures that have enacted the MDDLA in response
to the needs of victims of the illegal drug trade have acted in
accord with the legislative rationale behind the passage of
workers’ compensation acts. In both instances, the legislatures
identified a negligent defendant who inappropriately escapes
69

Discussed infra notes 189-98.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, §80, at 568.
71
Id.
72
Id., §80 at 569.
73
Id., §80 at 570.
74
Id., §80 at 573.
75
Id.
76
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 80, at 573 (5th ed. 1984) (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statisitcs,
Bull. No. 126, 1913, p. 9).
70
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liability under common law principles. Legislators have taken
notice that traditional common law principles of negligence fail
to consider the nuances of the illegal drug trade and have found
a solution in a statute with less stringent causation requirements.
Therefore, while critics of the MDDLA contend that the statute
is a departure from traditional tort law and compromises
fundamental principles of justice,77 the notion that the legislature
may, and should, create a remedy for plaintiffs who have been
injured but who are barred from recovery under the common
law is an established principle of legislative behavior.
C.

Standard of Proof

The MDDLA requires that the plaintiff prove the defendant’s
participation in the illegal drug market by “clear and convincing
evidence.”78 All other elements of the cause of action require
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.79 However, if a
defendant has a conviction under either state drug laws or the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, he or she is collaterally estopped from denying
participation in the illegal drug market.80
Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still demonstrate that the
defendant was engaged in the distribution of drugs during the
same time period in which the user used drugs.81 Under the
MDDLA, a drug distribution-offense conviction serves as prima
facie evidence of participation in the illegal drug market for the
two years preceding the date of the conduct that leads to the
suit.82 This provision allows plaintiffs to determine how long a
defendant has been involved in the market.83 Although
defendants who have previously been convicted of drug
distribution offenses are estopped from denying participation in
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Stasell, supra note 6, at 1024.
MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 13(a).
Id.
Id. § 13(b).
Id. § 6(b).
Id.
Bent et al., supra note 45, n.45.
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the illegal drug market, they may nonetheless offer evidence to
show that they did not engage in the distribution of illicit drugs
during the time period in question, thereby avoiding liability
under the MDDLA. Additionally, the absence of a criminal drug
conviction does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing suit
against a defendant.84
D. Imposing Liability under the MDDLA: Market Share
Liability
Market share liability theory serves as one of the central
methods for imposing liability on defendants brought into court
under the MDDLA.85 The following subsections describe the
circumstances leading to the creation of market share liability,
the public policy arguments in favor of implementing market
share liability, and the recent developments in market share
liability theory utilized by the MDDLA. Most significantly, just
as it is used for plaintiffs under the MDDLA, market share
liability was created to help injured plaintiffs overcome the
causation difficulties present when bringing suit against negligent
defendants.86
1. The Origins of Market Share Liability
Market share liability originated primarily with plaintiffs
who suffered harm at the hands of pharmaceutical companies. In
Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, the California Supreme Court
created market share liability to provide a remedy for a plaintiff
who suffered prenatal injuries as a result of her mother ingesting
the drug diethylstilbestrol (“DES”).87 Although the plaintiff in
Sindell suffered a distinct and easily demonstrable harm, it was
84

MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 13(a).
Daniel Bent, Market Share Liability Further Explained, available at
http://www.modelddla.com/Market_Liability_Further_Explained.htm (last
visited April 25, 2007).
86
See Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611 (1980);
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 166 Wis. 2d 166, 181 (1984).
87
Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d. at 588.
85
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unclear as to which drug manufacturing company had produced
the DES that led to the plaintiff’s injuries. Because of the
intricacies of the drug manufacturing business, it was impossible
for the plaintiff to prove with any certainty which drug
manufacturer produced the DES that her mother ingested.88 The
Sindell court’s decision was of particular importance to the
MDDLA because it created market share liability to enable a
plaintiff to recover from defendants who had clearly committed
tortious acts despite being unable to demonstrate that those acts
were the proximate causes of her injuries.89 Sindell shifted the
burden of proof to the defendant to show that it did not produce
the DES that injured the plaintiff, thereby allowing the
defendants to exculpate themselves.90
The central tenet of the market share liability theory
developed in Sindell is that defendants were to be held liable in
proportion to the percentage of DES that each had sold in
relation to the entire amount sold by all defendants.91
Accordingly, any defendant found liable in Sindell was
responsible for paying its market share portion of the total
damage award.92 This theory of assigning liability was
developed in part to provide a remedy for a plaintiff who had
suffered harm at the hands of negligent defendants, and was in
lieu of a more precise and accurate method for determining
defendants’ liability.93 Critics of market share liability contend
that under the Sindell rationale, defendants may be held liable
for harm they did not cause,94 but the California Supreme Court,
in defense of its decision, explained that “as between an
innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear
the cost of the injury.”95
88

Id. at 596.
Id. at 610.
90
Id. at 611.
91
See Id. at 611-13.
92
See Id.
93
Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d. 588, 615-16 (Cal. 1980).
94
Andrew B. Nace, Market Share Liability: A Current Assessment of a
Decade-Old Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395, 434 (1991).
95
Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11.
89
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Sindell was not the first time the California Supreme Court
relaxed a plaintiff’s evidentiary burden, however.96 The plaintiff
in Summers v. Tice filed a negligence claim against two
defendants after being shot in the eye during a hunting trip.97
After conceding that contributory negligence was not an issue,
and determining that one of the two defendants must have been
the one responsible for the plaintiff’s injury, the Summers court
held that the defendants, rather than the plaintiff, were obligated
to offer affirmative proof of lack of causation in order to avoid
liability.98 The court implemented a theory of alternative liability
and explained: “when we consider the relative position of the
parties and the results that would flow if plaintiff was required
to pin the injury on one of the defendants only, a requirement
that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants
becomes manifest.”99
2. Public Policy Supports the Implementation of
Market Share Liability
As in Summers, the plaintiff in Sindell was not penalized for
the lack of evidence of causation and, “although the absence of
such evidence is not attributable to the defendants either, their
conduct in marketing a drug, the effects of which are delayed
for many years, played a significant role in creating the
unavailability of proof.”100 The Sindell court articulated three
policy reasons supporting the adoption of market share liability,
all of which are fully applicable to the MDDLA: 1) the
negligent defendant should bear the burden of an injury rather
than the innocent plaintiff; 2) manufacturers have an incentive to
improve product safety if subject to increased liability; and 3)
drug manufacturers are in a better position to absorb the cost of
the harm than the plaintiff.101 The court looked to Justice
96

See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
Id. at 82, 199 P. 2d at 2.
98
Id. at 86, 199 P. 2d at 2.
99
Id.
100
Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611 (1980).
101
Id.
97
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Traynor’s opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,102 and
recognized that “in an era of mass production and complex
marketing methods the traditional standard of negligence [is]
insufficient to govern the obligations of manufacturer to
consumer, so we should acknowledge that some adaptation of
the rules of causation and liability may be appropriate in these
recurring circumstances.”103
The Sindell court’s reasons for embracing market share
liability are even stronger in the context of the MDDLA. As
with plaintiffs who have suffered harm at the hands of
pharmaceutical companies, plaintiffs bringing suit under the
MDDLA have a difficult time identifying the specific dealerdefendant who was responsible for providing the drug user with
the drugs that formed the basis for recovery. More importantly,
however, the criticisms of market share liability, as articulated
with regard to litigation against pharmaceutical companies, are
much weaker when applied to litigation against drug dealers.
For example, several state courts have rejected market share
liability theory in cases involving suits against drug
manufacturers because of the detrimental effects such a system
of liability would have upon the industry.104 This concern
becomes irrelevant when courts or legislatures consider market
share liability in the context of the illicit drug trade. As applied
under the MDDLA, market share liability has the potential to
aid in the ferrying out of crime since it will, at least
theoretically, increase the cost of production for large scale
illegal drug distributors. From an economic standpoint, an
increase in the cost of production will decrease profits and
eventually increase prices of narcotics, thereby serving as a
deterrent to both individual dealers and to users who seek to
102

24 Cal. 2d 453 (1944).
Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610.
104
See, e.g., Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 261 (1990)
(explaining that market share liability will increase the cost of production and
therefore decrease research and development of advancements in
pharmaceutical field); Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155 (1989)
(holding that market share liability would cripple the pharmaceutical
industry).
103
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participate in drug distribution-related activity.
3. Recent Developments to Market Share Liability
Market share liability is not a stagnant concept. After its
creation in Sindell, a number of courts involved in DES
litigation adopted the principle that market share liability should
serve as a method for imposing liability upon negligent
defendants.105 In Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., the Wisconsin
Supreme Court modified the Sindell court’s theory of market
share liability by focusing more upon the risk of harm created
by the defendant.106 As in Sindell, the plaintiff in Collins
suffered harm as a result of her mother’s ingestion of DES.107
The Collins court determined that the plaintiff had suffered an
apparent harm at the hands of a tortfeasor, but recognized that
Collins was unable to identify the manufacturer of the DES
ingested by her mother for three reasons: the drug’s generic
form, the large number of producers and marketers of the drug,
and the scarcity of records indicating specific DES production
by individual manufacturers.108 When faced with the “choice of
either fashioning a method of recovery for the DES case which
[would] deviate from traditional notions of tort law, or
permitting possibly negligent defendants to escape liability to an
innocent, injured plaintiff,”109 the Collins court chose to depart
from the common law principles of negligence in order to
permit recovery on behalf of the plaintiff.110
In defense of its choice to provide Collins with a remedy,
the court explained:
the common law is a dynamic principle which allows
105

See, e.g., McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.
1983); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979);
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571 (1982); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co,
116 Wis. 2d 166 (1984).
106
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 166.
107
Id. at 174.
108
Id. at 180.
109
Id. at 181.
110
Id.
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it to grow and to tailor itself to meet the changing
needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, which, if
correctly understood, was not static and did not
forever prevent the courts from reversing themselves
or from applying principles of common law to new
situations as the need arose.111
Nonetheless, the Collins court determined that the theories of
alternative and market share liability developed in Summers and
Sindell should not apply to Collins’ cause of action.112 With
regard to alternative liability, the court reasoned that Collins,
unlike the plaintiff in Summers, could never join all of the
negligent defendants.113 To do so would require Collins to join
every DES manufacturer who produced DES during the time
period and within the geographic area in which Collins’s mother
ingested the DES that led to Collins’s injuries. Further, after
considering and ultimately rejecting Sindell’s version of market
share liability, the Collins court explained that defining and
proving a defendant’s market share is too difficult a task to
require of plaintiffs given the lack of available records held by
drug companies.114
As a result, the Collins court developed its own version of
market share liability based on the principle that “each defendant
contributed to the risk of injury to the public and, consequently,
the risk of injury to individual plaintiffs such as Therese
Collins.”115 This theory of liability rests upon the idea that each
defendant is responsible to a certain degree for producing or
marketing a drug that has been determined to be dangerous.116
The Collins court noted that manufacturers of harmful drugs
111

Id. at 182 (quoting Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 11 (1962)).
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 184, 189 (1984)
113
Id. at 184.
114
Id. at 189.
115
Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
116
Id. See also, Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law:
Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982). The Collins court
did not agree with Robinson’s theory, however, that contributing to the risk
of harm by acting as a DES manufacturer was sufficient to subject a
defendant to liability.
112
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were in a better position to absorb the cost of liability because
consumers and physicians normally base their decisions to use a
drug on the information provided by the manufacturers, thereby
leaving the consumers “virtually helpless to protect themselves
from serious injuries caused by deleterious drugs.”117
Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded the case
and required the plaintiff to demonstrate that her injuries were
caused by her mother’s ingestion of DES, that the defendant
produced the same type of drug as her mother ingested, and that
the defendant breached a legally recognized duty to the plaintiff
by producing or marketing DES.118
The Collins court’s formulation of a risk-oriented version of
market share liability may also be imposed on defendants in
MDDLA litigation. First, like the problems faced by the
plaintiff in Collins, plaintiffs who suffer harm as a result of drug
use have difficulty identifying negligent defendants capable of
satisfying an adequate award. Because illicit drugs are often
manufactured in generic form, there exists an indeterminable
number of drug producers and dealers. Moreover, due in large
part to the illegality of their trade, drug dealers keep few, if
any, records of their business.119
Second, the required elements for demonstrating liability
under Collins parallel those of the MDDLA. Although plaintiffs
under Collins and the MDDLA are not required to show that the
defendant produced and/or distributed the exact drugs ingested
by the drug user whose drug use formed the basis for
recovery,120 plaintiffs in both contexts must demonstrate that the
drug user used the same type of drug produced or marketed by
the defendant. Third, much like the court’s reasoning in Collins,
the MDDLA seeks to impose liability upon otherwise negligent
defendants in an effort to provide a remedy for plaintiffs who
have suffered a demonstrable harm.
117

Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 192-93 (Wis. 1984).
Id. at 193.
119
Steven D. Levitt & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, An Economic Analysis
of a Drug-Selling Gang’s Finances 12-45 (American Bar Foundation,
Working Paper No. 9814, 1999).
120
Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 194.
118
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Last, Collins and the MDDLA help further similar policy
interests. The Collins court explained that a defendant may
implead as many third-party defendants as possible in order to
fairly distribute liability, so long as the original defendant can
show that the additional defendants produced the same type of
drug taken by the plaintiff’s mother which formed the basis for
the plaintiff’s recovery.121 The MDDLA addresses similar policy
concerns by permitting the joinder of additional defendants who
may share liability, and creating an incentive for drug dealers
who have been brought into court to disclose information that
might be used to implicate additional defendants.
To summarize, like plaintiffs in market share liability cases,
plaintiffs under the MDDLA are not tortfeasors and seek civil
remedies from negligent, and often times criminally culpable,
defendants.122 Plaintiffs in such cases, through no fault of their
own, have trouble proving causation. The Sindell court noted
that the defendants were not principally to blame for the lack of
causal evidence either, but that their conduct nonetheless played
a factor in the deficiency of proof.123 Defendants, however, play
a much larger role in the unavailability of evidence that may
indicate their participation in the illicit drug trade. Because of
the risks of arrest and incarceration, drug-dealer defendants
often go to great lengths to eliminate any basis of proof of
business transactions between themselves and drug users.
As a result, plaintiffs under the MDDLA often have little
evidence to offer showing a causal relationship between the
defendant and the drug user, despite the defendant’s obvious
criminal conduct. Therefore, despite market share liability
serving as the foundation for holding defendants accountable
under the MDDLA, the extent of a defendant’s liability is not
based entirely upon the drug dealer’s share in the illicit drug
market because such evidence is difficult to obtain. Instead, the
121

Id. at 195.
See supra notes 50-58, and accompanying text. As discussed earlier,
drug users themselves may also recover damages under the MDDLA, but
members of this class of plaintiffs are severely limited in the types of
damages they may seek. Bent et al., supra note 45.
123
Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11 (1980)
122
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MDDLA more closely embraces the risk-contribution version of
market share liability developed in Collins and permits a
negligent defendant to be held liable for the total amount of
damages awarded. This results in an incentive for drug dealers
to implead other drug dealers who contribute to the risk of drug
use in the target community so that they may share liability, and
also serves the overarching policy interest of deterring drug
distribution while encouraging defendants to identify those who
participate in the illegal drug market.
E.

Notable Cases Brought Under Drug Dealer Liability
Acts

The first case filed under a state’s DDLA was in Michigan
in the case of Ficano v. Clemens.124 In Ficano, two plaintiffs—
the estate of an infant, Felicia Brown, who was born addicted to
cocaine and eventually killed by her drug-addicted mother, and
the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department—brought suit against
two convicted drug dealers.125 Felicia Brown was underdeveloped as a result of her mother’s drug abuse and died as a
result of her heavy exposure to cocaine.126 In 1995, the court
entered a default judgment of $8.7 million against the two
defendants.127
This case highlights several interesting points. First, the
infant’s estate, not her mother, brought suit with the Sheriff’s
office.128 Instead of joining the lawsuit, Felicia Brown’s mother
was on trial for her murder.129 She was eventually convicted of
124

No. 95-512918 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne C’ty. 1995).
Stasell, supra note 6, at 1035-36 (citing Mediation Summary of
Plaintiff Robert A. Ficano at 3, 8; Stephen Jones, Suit Targets 4 Drug
Convicts for Damages in Tot’s Death, DET. FREE PRESS, May 3, 1995, at
C3).
126
Id. at 1036, n.87 (citing Mediation Summary of Plaintiff Robert A.
Ficano at 5).
127
Arnold Ceballos, New State Laws Let People Sue Drug Dealers,
WALL ST. J., Jul. 16, 1996, at B1.
128
See Stasell, supra note 6.
129
Stasell, supra note 6, at 1066, n.87 (citing Mediation Summary of
125
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second degree murder and received 15 to 25 years in prison.130
Second, under Michigan’s DDLA, the plaintiffs in Ficano
demonstrated liability by showing that the defendants had been
convicted of selling drugs in the same target community as that
in which the plaintiffs sustained harm.131 Nevertheless, while
such a conviction served as prima facie evidence that the
defendants participated in the distribution of illegal drugs for the
two years before and the two years after the conviction,132
defendants brought into court under any state’s DDLA,
including Michigan’s, have the opportunity to rebut such
presumptions based on criminal convictions if they show by
clear and convincing evidence that they did not participate in the
illegal drug market during the presumed time period.133
A more recent case was filed under South Dakota’s
DDLA.134 In Muhs v. Johnson, the plaintiff, Jean Muhs, sued
Wayne Johnson for damages resulting from a motor vehicle
accident.135 Muhs and her husband, Floyd, were driving along a
highway when another car swerved into their lane and struck
their vehicle.136 Floyd Muhs died at the scene of the accident,
and Jean Muhs suffered serious injuries, including a broken
neck, legs, and back.137 Mrs. Muhs was unable to attend her
husband’s funeral, could not speak clearly during the two to
three weeks following the accident, had screws drilled into her
head so that she could not move her neck, and could not walk

Plaintiff Alan A. May at 3).
130
Ceballos, supra note 127.
131
Stasell, supra note 6, at 1036 (citing Corey Williams, Ficano Seeks
Assets of Drug Dealers in Beating Death of Child, DET. NEWS, May 9, 1995,
at B4).
132
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1609 (West 2006).
133
Id.
134
No. 99-2870 (S.D., Minnehaha C’ty Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 2000).
135
American Trial Lawyers Assoc., Counsel Obtains Verdict Against
Drug Dealer Whose customers Caused Fatal Automobile Wreck, LAW
REPORTER, Vol. 43, No. 1 at 240 (2000).
136
Id.
137
Id.
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for more than a year.138 The vehicle that swerved into Muhs’
lane was operated by Daniel Bolls.139 Following the accident,
Bolls and his passenger, Carrie Ann Walker, were immediately
tested for narcotics and the results indicated that both were
under the influence of marijuana and methamphetamines.140
Walker told police that she and Bolls had received the
methamphetamine from the defendant, Wayne Johnson, earlier
that morning.141 Although Walker and Bolls were charged with
manslaughter, vehicular homicide, and ingestion of a controlled
substance, Muhs filed suit against Wayne Johnson under South
Dakota’s DDLA seeking recovery for medical expenses, loss of
consortium, and punitive damages.142
Unlike Ficano, the defendant in Muhs was represented in
court.143 Even so, the jury awarded a total of $268.7 million to
Muhs, $250 million of which constituted punitive damages.144
Under South Dakota’s DDLA, Muhs was able to demonstrate
liability by showing that Johnson provided Bolls and Walker
with the drugs that caused them to swerve into Muhs’ lane and
collide with her vehicle.145 Muhs, therefore, serves as an
example of a suit against the first class of defendants included in
the MDDLA—persons who knowingly distribute or participate in
the distribution of an illegal drug, the use of which forms the
basis of recovery.146 Unlike Ficano, many of the criticisms
resulting from the MDDLA’s relaxed causation requirements do
not apply in the context of a case like Muhs.
Despite this difference, Ficano and Muhs have several
important similarities. Both cases help further the universal
138

Id.
Id.
140
Id.
141
American Trial Lawyers Assoc., Counsel Obtains Verdict Against
Drug Dealer Whose customers Caused Fatal Automobile Wreck, LAW
REPORTER, Vol. 43, No. 1 at 240 (2000).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(b).
139
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interest of providing victims of the illegal drug market with a
remedy while deterring those who participate in the distribution
of drugs. Further, the plaintiffs in both cases encountered the
common problem of collecting the judgment from the liable
defendants. Plaintiffs under the MDDLA can expect to have
difficulty collecting judgments once a verdict has been reached
because many defendants will not be able to satisfy a large
award. However, with increased publicity and legislative support
for the MDDLA, plaintiffs may begin to file suit against
defendants more capable of fulfilling an adequate award. Even if
a defendant is not capable of fully satisfying an award under a
state’s DDLA, the statute provides incentives for defendants to
identify other participants in the illegal drug market so that they
may share liability.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MDDLA
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
serves as a check upon the authority of state legislatures to
deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property.147 Accordingly,
courts may review the fairness of procedures authorized by state
legislation or the fairness of decisions in particular cases.148
Additionally, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment provides that no person shall be “put in jeopardy of
life or limb” for the same offense twice.149 Critics of the
MDDLA raise two constitutional challenges based on these
principles: one, that the Act’s statutory presumptions violate the
procedural due process owed to defendants, and two, the Act
violates the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double
jeopardy by subjecting defendants to multiple punishments for
the same offense.150 Despite these claims, case law, fundamental
principles of procedural due process, and legislative history
147

See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWACK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 14.6 (3d ed. 2006).
148
ROTUNDA & NOWACK, supra note 147.
149
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
150
See, e.g., Stasell, supra note 6; Baar, supra note 6.
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suggest that the MDDLA would survive such constitutional
challenges.
A. The MDDLA Satisfies the Constitutional Requirements of
the Due Process Clause
When performing a due process analysis, courts must first
determine the threshold issue of whether the state has deprived
an individual of life, liberty, or property.151 Only after a court
finds that the state has deprived an individual of any of these
rights, must it then consider whether the procedure used by the
state satisfies the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.152 To help articulate what these
requirements are, the Supreme Court developed a balancing test
in Matthews v. Eldridge.153 In Eldridge, the Court held that
determining the constitutionality of a state’s process for
depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property required
consideration of three factors: first, the private interest that will
be affected by the state’s action; second, the possibility of
mistaken deprivation weighed against the value of procedural
alternatives; and third, the state’s interest, including the added
burdens of requiring additional or substitute procedures.154
Because judgments awarded under the MDDLA would
clearly constitute a deprivation of property, the more critical
determination is whether the MDDLA satisfies the Court’s three
pronged balancing test handed down in Eldridge. Although even
critics of the MDDLA concede that the Act provides defendants
with three significant components of sufficient due process—
notice of being sued, a trial to determine issues of fact, and a
neutral decision maker—procedural due process challenges arise
in regard to the Act’s statutory presumption.155
Applied to the MDDLA’s statutory presumption, the
151
152
153
154
155

ROTUNDA & NOWACK, supra note 147, § 17.1.
Id.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Id.
See, e.g., Stasell, supra note 6; Baar, supra note 6.
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Eldridge test requires courts to balance 1) a drug dealer’s private
property interest; 2) the risk of a mistaken deprivation of the
defendant’s property; and 3) the government’s interest in
providing victims of the illegal drug trade with a civil remedy
for their injuries.156 As discussed earlier, the MDDLA creates a
presumption of liability of a defendant after the plaintiff shows
that the defendant: 1) distributed illegal drugs in the user’s target
community; 2) distributed the same type of illegal drug as was
used by the drug user; and 3) was engaged in the distribution of
drugs during the same time period in which the drugs were
used.157 Additionally, a defendant is collaterally estopped from
denying participation in the illegal drug market if he has been
convicted under either state drug distribution laws or the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970.158 Opponents of the MDDLA claim that the Act fails
under the Eldridge test because it “creates an irrational and
irrebuttable presumption of liability once the plaintiff establishes
[the] three elements.”159
Admittedly, a statutory presumption cannot satisfy the due
process clause without “some rational connection between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed.”160 However,
opponents to the MDDLA support their position by erroneously
contending that “a statutory presumption is thus invalid unless
the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the
proved fact.”161 Although this standard is applicable in some
circumstances, the cited authority, Leary v. United States, does
not apply to the MDDLA. Rather, Leary is clearly
distinguishable as it considered the constitutionality of a criminal
statutory presumption.162 Given the many procedural safeguards
156

Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
158
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
159
Stasell, supra note 6 at 1047.
160
See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 4 (1976); Tot
v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
161
Stasell, supra note 6 (citing Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36
(1969)).
162
Leary, 395 U.S. at 36.
157
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provided to a criminal defendant that are not provided to a civil
defendant, it follows that the Constitution would permit a lower
standard for determining whether statutory presumptions in civil
cases, as compared to those in criminal cases, satisfy the
Eldridge test.163
In 1988, the Supreme Court confirmed the notion that
statutory presumptions in civil proceedings receive less scrutiny
than statutory presumptions in criminal proceedings.164 In
Feicock v. Feicock, a man was held in contempt for failure to
comply with court-ordered child support.165 The majority
focused primarily on the different burdens of proof, holding that
California’s statutory presumption that an obligated parent
remains able to make required child support payments would
violate principles of procedural due process if applied in a
criminal proceeding because the presumption “would undercut
the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”166
The Court emphasized that the relative high burden of proof
required for criminal convictions prohibited the shifting of the
burden of persuasion to the defendant, but “if applied in a civil
proceeding, however, this particular statute would be
constitutionally valid.”167 The Court further explained that if the
state court only imposed civil remedies, “it would be improper
to invalidate the result merely because the Due Process Clause,
as applied in criminal proceedings, was not satisfied,” thereby
recognizing the distinction between civil and criminal statutory
presumptions.168 Consequently, any challenge to the
constitutionality of the MDDLA’s statutory presumption based
upon the standard used for criminal statutory presumptions is
163

For a more in-depth discussion of the litany of procedural safeguards
afforded to criminal defendants but not provided to civil defendants, see,
e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L. J. 1795, 1799 (1992).
164
See Feicock v. Feicock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988).
165
Id.
166
Id. at 637.
167
Id. at 637-38. (citing Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 75-76 (1948);
Oriel v. Russel, 278 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1929)).
168
Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
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invalid because the MDDLA only provides for a civil remedy,
and therefore, such challenges are in direct conflict with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Feicock.
The elements required by the MDDLA’s statutory
presumption, taken together with the Supreme Court’s decisions,
state case law, and defendants’ ability to rebut the Act’s
statutory presumption, indicate that the presumption passes
constitutional muster under the Eldridge test.169 Even if the
Court were to agree with critics’ claims that the Leary standard
for rationality of statutory presumptions is applicable to civil
proceedings, the elements a plaintiff must prove before imposing
liability on a defendant under the Act’s statutory presumption
clearly show that the presumed fact is “more likely than not” to
have occurred. At a minimum, a defendant liable under the
MDDLA must be shown to have distributed illegal drugs in the
same target community as the user, to have distributed the same
type of illegal drugs used by the user, and to have distributed
drugs at the same time as when the user used drugs.170
The proof of such facts unquestionably makes it more likely
than not that the defendant contributed to the plaintiff’s harm by
participating in the distribution of drugs to the user whose
actions formed the basis for recovery. Therefore, the elements
required for enforcement of the MDDLA’s presumption satisfy
the Leary standard. The Court’s distinction between criminal and
statutory presumptions demonstrates the Court’s determination
that a civil defendant’s property interest may receive less
protection than a criminal defendant’s liberty interest.171 As a
result, the consideration of the second prong of the Eldridge
test—the risk of erroneous deprivation of property—assumes
greater significance in the determination of whether the
MDDLA’s presumption is constitutional.
Because the MDDLA allows the defendant to rebut the
statutory presumption, the risk of erroneous deprivation of
169

See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334; Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,
468 (1943); Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 250-52 (1957).
170
See MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(b).
171
See Feicock v. Feicock, 485 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1988).
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property is not substantial enough to render the Act
unconstitutional. Although plaintiffs under the MDDLA may
impose liability upon defendants after proving three elements,
any defendant, regardless of whether he has been convicted of a
drug distribution offense, may offer evidence for the purpose of
rebutting the presumption of liability.172 Critics of the Act assert
that “the presumption of liability . . . is effectively
irrebuttable,”173 but such claims lose sight of two important
principles of the MDDLA. First, despite that a conviction for a
drug distribution offense serves as prima facie evidence of a
defendant’s participation in the illegal drug market for the two
years preceding the date of the plaintiff’s injury, this provision
only serves to collaterally estop defendants from denying having
ever participated in the illegal drug market.174 Therefore,
defendants under the MDDLA who have prior convictions for
drug distribution offenses may still offer proof that they did not
participate in the distribution of illegal drugs either during the
two years preceding the date of the plaintiff’s injury or during
the relevant time period during which the plaintiff’s injury
occurred. Such an evidentiary showing would enable a defendant
to effectively rebut the Act’s statutory presumption, allowing a
reasonable jury to find in his favor.
Second, the MDDLA’s critics also lose sight of the
underlying principle that, because of the nature of the illicit drug
trade, defendants brought into court via the MDDLA are in the
best position to supply exculpatory evidence. Such a shift of the
burden of persuasion would violate the Due Process Clause in a
criminal proceeding, but may be constitutionally assigned to the
civil defendant after the plaintiff has made a factual
demonstration.175 Moreover, though the Supreme Court has held
that there must be a rational connection between the facts proved
and a statutory presumption for it to be considered valid, it has
also held that courts may consider the “comparative convenience
172

MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(b), see
also supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
173
Stasell, supra note 6, at 1049; see also Baar, supra note 6, at 193.
174
MODEL DRUG DEALER LIABILITY ACT, supra note 41, § 6(b).
175
Feicock, 485 U.S. at 637-38.
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of producing evidence of the ultimate fact.”176 That defendants
are better situated to provide evidence as to their liability carries
considerable weight as to the determination that the Act’s
presumption is rebuttable. Accordingly, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of property is outweighed by the government’s
interest in providing victims of the illegal drug trade with an
adequate and available civil remedy.
Additional due process challenges arise because of the Act’s
departure from traditional proximate cause requirements in favor
of a risk-oriented approach to market share liability theory.177
Nevertheless, the enactment of Dram Shop statutes and workers’
compensation laws, together with the Supreme Court’s repeated
decisions to deny certiorari to cases permitting market share
liability,178 provide a sound basis for the constitutionality of the
MDDLA’s relaxation of proximate cause requirements.
The constitutionality of state Dram Shop acts also lends
support to the MDDLA. In Pierce v. Albanese, Connecticut’s
Supreme Court considered whether the State’s Dram Shop Act
violated the Due Process Clause of the federal and state
Constitutions on the grounds that the statute imposed civil
liability on defendants who served alcohol without requiring a
causal connection between the sale of intoxicating liquor and the
intoxication which caused the plaintiff’s injury.179 The plaintiff
in Pierce brought suit against a tavern owner under
Connecticut’s Dram Shop Act after being struck by an
automobile operated by an intoxicated driver who had been sold

176

Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
See, e.g., Stasell, supra note 6; Baar, supra note 6. For an
explanation of the risk oriented approach to market share liability used by the
MDDLA, see Collins, 116 Wis. 2d 166, 193-94 (1984), discussed supra
notes 105-18.
178
Meeks, supra note 20, at 344 (citing Sindell v. Abbot Labs., 607
P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944
(1989); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 826 (1984).
179
144 Conn. 241 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 15 (1957).
177
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alcohol at the defendant’s tavern.180 The Pierce court recognized
that the Connecticut Dram Shop Act “created an action unknown
to the common law.”181 Nonetheless, the court upheld the statute
on the grounds that, through exercise of its police powers, a
state may modify or remove traditional common law principles
to provide damages for injuries without violating constitutional
requirements.182
The defendant in Pierce asserted that the statute violated the
Due Process Clause as he should not be held liable absent a
showing that the intoxicating liquor that he sold significantly
contributed to the intoxication of the person whose conduct gave
rise to the plaintiff’s claim.183 After determining that the statute
was constitutional, the Pierce Court explained that “the statute
does not require proof that the sale of intoxicating liquor
produced or contributed to the intoxication of the person to
whom it was sold.”184 Accordingly, after the plaintiff provided
evidence that the driver to whom the liquor was sold was
intoxicated, and that such intoxication played a role in the
negligent operation of a vehicle, the Pierce Court upheld the
trial court’s jury instructions and affirmed the jury’s verdict in
favor of the plaintiff.185
Most Dram Shop laws, including the one at issue in Pierce,
parallel the MDDLA in a number of ways and represent a
constitutionally permissible departure from the common law’s
traditional causation principles.186 Most notably, the majority of
180

Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 249 (citing Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 251
(Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 318 (1949); Beck v.
Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 35 (1955); Tarwater v. Atlanta Co., 176 Tenn. 510,
512 (1940); Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 203 (1936)).
182
Feierstein, 222 Wis. at 250 (citing Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89
Conn. 143, 147 (1915); Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 377 (1928); Levy
v. Daniels’ U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 337 (1928); Verrilli
v. Damilowski, 140 Conn. 358, 360 (1953)).
183
Id. at 254.
184
Pierce v. Albanaese, 144 Conn. 241, 263 (1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 15 (1957).
185
Id.
186
Courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of Dram Shop
181
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Dram Shop Acts do not require the plaintiff to prove that the
liquor provided by the defendant to the driver played a role in
the driver’s intoxication.187 The Pierce court defended the
constitutionality of such statutes:
[I]f one desires to engage in the liquor business. . .he
assumes of necessity the risk of a great variety of
situations which could impose liability upon him. He
is bound to presume that the liquor which he sells
will be consumed sometime. The act does not impose
absolute liability upon the [defendant] but leaves to
him a number of defenses.188
Similarly, drug dealers assume the risks associated with
conducting their business, including liability for the damage or
harm they may cause. The overwhelming support for the
constitutionality of Dram Shop legislation lends considerable
strength to the assertion that the MDDLA’s deviation from
traditional causation requirements is constitutional.
In addition to dram shop legislation, workers’ compensation
laws also serve as an example of how legislatures may
constitutionally modify or abolish specific fundamentals of tort
liability.189 Under the common law, employees were generally
Acts. See, e.g. Pierce, 144 Conn. at 253 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles C’ty, 213 Cal. 596, 598 (1931)); Garrity v. Eiger, 272
Ill. 127, 134 (1916), aff’d, 246 U.S. 97 (1918) (holding that “in view of the
broad authority of the states over the liquor traffic, and the established right
to prohibit or regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, we are unable to
discover that there has been a deprivation of property rights in the legislation
in question in violation of due process of law secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment”); Bertholf v. O’Reilly, 74 N.Y. 509, 517 (1878); Kennedy v.
Garrigan, 121 N.W. 783 (S.D. 1909).
187
Pierce, 144 Conn. at 254.
188
Id. at 252.
189
Workers’ compensation statutes have generally been upheld as
constitutional, particularly in the face of challenges brought under the Due
Process Clause. See, e.g., Shaw v. Salt River Valley Water Users Ass’n., 69
Ariz. 309 (1950); Khoury v. Carvel Homes South, Inc., 403 So.2d 1043
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 412 So.2d 467 (Fla. 1982); Walters
v. Blackledge, 220 Miss. 485 (1954) (holding that Mississippi Workers’
Compensation Law does not violate Due Process Clause despite abrogating
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unable to receive adequate awards for injuries resulting from
their employer’s breach of duty because of the “unholy trinity”
of defenses available to defendants: contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule.190 It followed
that many industrial injuries went uncompensated, thereby
forcing the employee—the least-capable individual—to bear the
resulting financial burden.191 The common law’s inability to
impose liability onto employers induced extremely poor working
conditions, inhumane practices, and most significantly, a lack of
an incentive for employers to improve their work
environments.192 Reluctant to take legislative matters into their
own hands, the courts waited for legislatures to enact a change
in the common law’s rules for injured employees.193
Workers’ compensation statutes also parallel the MDDLA on
statutory and public policy levels. Under these statutes, an
employer is subject to liability for the injuries arising out of his
enterprise, regardless of whether he or the injured employee was
negligent.194 Put plainly, workers’ compensation laws allow
recovery not only in cases in which the employer has not
breached a duty to the employee (e.g. an unavoidable accident),
but also in cases in which the employee’s own negligence was a
factor in causing his injuries.195 Therefore, both workers’
compensation laws and the MDDLA deviate from the common
law’s causation requirement in order to allow plaintiffs to
overcome the obstacles to recovery that otherwise permit
negligent defendants to avoid liability.
While both the MDDLA and workers’ compensation laws
provide a civil remedy for plaintiffs who have suffered a
demonstrable harm, each scheme also creates an incentive for
right to bring suit for personal injury and subjecting employers to liability in
the absence of neglect or fault).
190
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 568.
191
Id. § 80 at 572.
192
Id. § 80 at 573.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
See Walters, 220 Miss. at 507. See also KEETON ET. AL, supra note
13, § 80, at 573.
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defendants to refrain from tortious conduct. In the same way
that workers’ compensation laws were enacted to make working
conditions safer, the MDDLA represents an effort to decrease
the prevalence of illegal drugs. Workers’ compensation acts rest
upon the theory that “the cost of the product should bear the
blood of the workman.”196 This theory holds that damages paid
to injured employees should be absorbed by the employer as a
cost of production, much like the servicing of machinery or
other operating costs.197 As the employer assumes these costs,
he eventually passes them onto the consumer in the form of
higher prices.198 Similarly, the MDDLA has the potential to
drive up drug dealers’ production costs by subjecting them to
liability for their conduct, thereby raising the cost of illegal
drugs for consumers.
The MDDLA satisfies the constitutional requirements of the
Due Process Clause for several reasons. First, the Supreme
Court recognizes the distinction between criminal and civil
statutory presumptions and provides that the burden of
persuasion may be shifted to the defendant in a civil
proceeding.199 Second, the Eldridge Court’s balancing test for
determining the constitutionality of statutory presumptions
indicates that the MDDLA’s presumption comports with due
process. Consider the application of the Eldridge test: the
government’s compelling interest in providing an appropriate
civil remedy for victims, defendants’ relatively low property
interests, and the rebuttable nature of the MDDLA’s statutory
presumption all weigh in favor of upholding the Act’s
presumption. Finally, the Supreme Court recognized that “due
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands.”200 Therefore, given the
196

KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 80, at 573 (quoting Francis Bohlen,
A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 25 HARV. L.
REV. 328, 401, 517 (1912)).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
See Feicock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988); see also supra notes 162-68 and
accompanying text.
200
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
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obstacles to recovery that injured plaintiffs face due to the
secretive nature of the illegal drug trade, the MDDLA’s
legislative deviation from traditional causation principles is
within the limits of the Constitution.
B. The MDDLA Does Not Violate the Fifth Amendment’s
Protection Against Double Jeopardy
Although the MDDLA imposes civil liability on some
defendants who may have already been subject to criminal
liability, the Act does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Double
Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause “protects only against the
imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same
offense.”201 Therefore, because the MDDLA inflicts a civil,
rather than criminal punishment, it passes muster under the Fifth
Amendment. Nevertheless, the MDDLA’s opponents claim that
the Act violates defendants’ protection against double jeopardy
because the statute intends to punish and deter defendants.202 In
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson v. United
States, however, the MDDLA survives constitutional scrutiny
under the Fifth Amendment’s protection against Double
Jeopardy.
In Hudson, the Supreme Court considered whether the
Double Jeopardy Clause protected three defendants from being
indicted for violating federal banking statutes after the
government had already imposed monetary penalties in a civil
suit arising from the same conduct. The Hudson Court
ultimately determined that the monetary penalties enforced by
the government in the civil proceeding were in fact civil, and
therefore did not render the subsequent criminal prosecution
violative of the Fifth Amendment.203 Most significantly,
471, 481 (1972)).
201
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (emphasis in original)
(citing United States ex. Rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943);
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)).
202
See, e.g., Stasell, supra note 6; Baar, supra note 6.
203
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96.
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however, the Court abandoned its method of analysis in Halper
largely on the grounds that the Halper Court failed to determine
the threshold issue of whether a penalty was criminal in nature
before applying the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause
to the sanction at issue.204
Hudson held that the Halper Court improperly ignored
traditional double jeopardy doctrine.205 The defendant in Halper
asserted his Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy
after the government brought a civil action against him under the
False Claims Act for conduct that had already resulted in a two
year prison sentence.206 The Halper Court, determining whether
the punishment imposed was civil or criminal, considered only
whether the sanctions were so inconsistent with the harm caused
that it represented a criminal punishment.207 Halper overemphasized this single factor, essentially making it the
determinative factor.208 In response, Hudson held that “no one
factor should be considered controlling as they ‘may often point
in differing directions.’”209
The Supreme Court’s test for determining whether a
punishment is criminal or civil requires consideration of two
questions.210 First, courts must ask whether the legislature either
expressly or implicitly intended the sanction to be classified as a
civil or criminal punishment.211 Second, even it is found that the
legislature intended a civil punishment, courts must determine
whether the sanction is so punitive as to transform it into a

204

Id. at 96, 101.
Id. at 101.
206
Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-38.
207
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101. Although Halper violated the False Claims
Act on 65 different instances, thereby subjecting him to liability for a penalty
of $130,000, his conduct actually defrauded the government of approximately
$600. Id.
208
Id.
209
Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169
(1963)).
210
Id. at 99.
211
Id. (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
205
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criminal punishment.212 Considering the first question, the
legislative intent of the MDDLA is clear. Much like Congress’
enactment of the relevant statute in Hudson,213 the MDDLA
expressly provides that any monetary penalties imposed under its
legislative scheme constitute civil remedies that may be obtained
via civil proceedings. 214
In answering the Hudson test’s second question, several
factors provide “useful guideposts,”215 including: 1) to what
extent, if any, the penalty involves an affirmative restraint such
as imprisonment; 2) whether the penalty has historically been
considered a punishment; 3) whether the sanction is imposed
only after a finding of scienter; 4) whether the penalty
encourages the traditional goals associated with criminal
punishments such as retribution and deterrence; 5) whether the
conduct giving rise to the penalty constitutes a criminal offense;
6) whether there is a possible alternative purpose for the
penalty; and 7) whether the sanction is excessive with regard to
the alternative purpose.216 Additionally, Hudson explained that
the factors must be applied to the statute on its face, and that
“only the clearest proof” enables a court to convert what the
legislature intended as a civil remedy into a criminal
punishment.217
Much like the civil penalty at issue in Hudson, the civil
remedies imposed under the MDDLA are not so punitive as to
assume a criminal classification. The MDDLA seeks to provide
a civil remedy to plaintiffs who have suffered a demonstrable
harm, thereby compelling liable defendants to pay civil
damages.218 Any affirmative restraint resulting from the
212

Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99; 118 S.Ct. 488, 493
(1997) (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49; Rex Trailer Co.
v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)).
213
Id. at 103.
214
See Bent et al., supra note 45.
215
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99.
216
Id. (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169).
217
Id. at 100 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169; Ward, 448
U.S. at 249).
218
Bent et al., supra note 45.
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defendant’s conduct arises during a separate criminal
prosecution. Additionally, monetary penalties have not
historically been interpreted as constituting criminal
punishments.219 Moreover, the MDDLA furthers two goals
traditionally associated with criminal punishments—retribution
and deterrence. However, the Court recognized that “all civil
penalties have some deterrent effect,” and “if a sanction must be
‘solely’ remedial (i.e. entirely non-deterrent) to avoid
implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause, then no civil penalties
are beyond the scope of the Clause.”220 The Hudson Court
explained that the deterrent effect or purpose of a civil sanction
was insufficient proof that a civil penalty should be considered a
criminal punishment because deterrence may permissibly serve
as a goal of both criminal and civil liability.221 Therefore, the
MDDLA’s secondary goal of deterrence does not render it
violative of the protection against double jeopardy.
The MDDLA undoubtedly subjects defendants to civil
liability for conduct that constitutes a criminal offense, but
challenges to the Act’s constitutionality lose sight of the fact that
there is a rational alternative purpose to the legislation, namely
providing victims of the illegal drug trade with a remedial
course of action.222 Under the Hudson test, this alternative
purpose supports the proposition that monetary penalties
imposed under the MDDLA are not so punitive as to transform
the civil remedy into a criminal punishment. Moreover, the
Hudson Court explained that civil liability arising from the same
conduct that gives rise to criminal liability does not necessarily
219

Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997).
Id. at 102 (citing Dep’t of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511
U.S. 767, 777 (1994) (holding that the presence of a deterrent purpose or
effect was not determinative when considering if a sanction violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause)).
221
Id. at 105 (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996)
(rejecting the argument that civil forfeitures violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause)). See also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996) (holding
that civil forfeiture’s deterrent purpose is separate from any punitive
purpose).
222
Bent et al., supra note 45.
220
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cause the monetary sanctions to assume a criminal nature,
particularly when considering whether the sanction constitutes a
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.223
After applying the factors set out in Hudson, it is clear that
the civil remedy provided by the MDDLA does not amount to
the clearest proof required by the Court to transform what was
intended as a monetary sanction into a criminal punishment.224
The legislative intent and insufficiently punitive aspects satisfy
the standard established by the Supreme Court in Hudson.
Therefore, the MDDLA does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against double jeopardy.
CONCLUSION
The MDDLA should be perceived as another legislative
innovation created to help cure a social injustice presented under
the common law. In addition to the need for remedial legislation
to solve the causation difficulties victims face, a variety of
different jurisdictions have accepted theories of market share
liability. Most notably, the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied
certiorari to appellants seeking to overturn decisions that have
imposed liability via market share liability, including the riskoriented approach to market share liability established in
Collins.225 The Supreme Court’s recurring unwillingness to
overturn decisions imposing liability based upon market share
liability theory is particularly supportive of the MDDLA’s
constitutionality as the Act employs virtually the same market
share liability model as was considered by the Collins Court.
223

Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105 (citing Ursery, 518 U.S. at 292; United
States v. Dixon 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993) (disavowing the same-conduct test
in the context of double jeopardy violations)).
224
Id. at 100 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169; Ward, 448
U.S. at 249).
225
See Meeks, supra note 20, at 344 (citing Sindell v. Abbot Labs., 607
P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944
(1989); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 826 (1984)).
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Moreover, the enactment of workers’ compensation statutes
and Dram Shop acts represent instances in which the legislature
recognized a problem that the common law was ill-equipped to
solve, and in response, enacted legislation so as to provide
victims with a civil remedy. Both types of legislation have been
held constitutionally valid across almost all jurisdictions,226 and
the MDDLA seeks to serve the same types of policy interests as
these well-accepted statutes.
Last, in light of the Court’s clear distinction between
criminal and civil statutory presumptions,227 and the rebuttable
nature of the MDDLA’s presumption of liability, the MDDLA
satisfies the balancing of interests provided for in the Eldridge
test. Furthermore, in addition to allowing for civil sanctions to
serve deterrent purposes, the Hudson Court also required the
clearest proof that the penalty imposed was so punitive as to
alter what the legislature intended as a civil remedy into a
criminal punishment, thereby overturning Halper.228 As applied
to the MDDLA, the Act’s clear intent for the penalty to be civil,
along with its insufficiently punitive nature under the factors laid
out in Hudson, demonstrate that it does not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Taken together, these considerations heavily
support the constitutionality of the MDDLA.
The potential effects of the MDDLA are also encouraging.
At the heart of the MDDLA is the premise that participants in
the illegal drug market are heavily motivated by the opportunity
to acquire wealth.229 Despite a highly skewed wage system,
economists claim that many low-level drug dealers enter the
illegal drug trade at a young age for the same reasons that smalltown prom queens move to Hollywood and high school
quarterbacks lift weights at 5 a.m.: “they all want to succeed in
an extremely competitive field in which, if you reach the top,
226
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you are paid a fortune.”230 Although the rank and file members
of an illegal drug operation stand to make relatively low wages,
mid-to-upper level dealers can acquire sizeable salaries.231 In
fact, a field study of an illegal drug operation that was operating
out of a large, industrial city recorded one of the operation’s
mid-level leaders as having earned monthly revenues of
approximately $32,000—an annual total of $384,000.232 After
spending funds on business costs such as weapons, wholesale
drugs, and payments to higher-level leaders, this mid-level
leader was left with monthly profits of approximately $8,500, or
an annual salary of just over $100,000.233 Setting aside the fact
that this income is, tax-free, the data for this mid-level leader
nonetheless represents what many entrants into the illegal drug
market strive for—affluence.234 With high-level dealers earning
upwards of $500,000 annually,235 the MDDLA serves as an
appropriate solution for enabling plaintiffs to subject wealthy
drug dealers to liability, thereby permitting victims to receive an
adequate remedy while providing a deterrent to future entrants
into the illegal drug market.
Moreover, despite often severe sentencing guidelines,
additional data indicates that criminal punishments are
insufficient to serve as deterrents to participating in the illegal
drug market.236 One study reported overwhelmingly high risks
of arrest and serious bodily injury to its dealers, and yet, the
drug ring enjoyed an over-supply of labor.237 The most alarming
statistic was that one out of every four of the drug ring’s dealers
230
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had been killed since the inception of the operation.238 Steven
Levitt and Stephen Dubner effectively highlight the significance
of this statistic by comparing it to death row inmates’ chances of
survival. For instance, in 2003, Texas—responsible for the most
executions of any state in the U.S.—had over 500 prisoners
awaiting execution on death row.239 Of these 500 prisoners, 24
were executed in 2003, equaling approximately five percent of
the state’s death row inmates.240 Evidently, drug dealers in the
operation that was the subject of the economist’s study had a
much higher risk of death than prisoners awaiting execution on
Texas’ death row, yet market forces and an over-abundance of
labor continually allowed the drug operation’s leaders to pay
low-level dealers comparably insignificant salaries.241
This data emphasizes the need for legislatures to utilize
innovative schemes like the MDDLA in order to provide an
adequate deterrent for those who consider becoming drug
dealers, as well as the necessity for affording victims of the
illegal trade a satisfactory remedy. That legislatures have
historically enacted statutes deviating from traditional common
law principles of liability in order to aid injured plaintiffs is
strong support for the enactment of the legislation based upon
the MDDLA. Not only are future drug dealers lured by the
prospect of earning high salaries, many current dealers are
capable of paying substantial judgments to injured plaintiffs. For
these reasons, the MDDLA is an appropriate and constitutionally
sound legislative proposal.
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